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INCONVENIENCE OR INDIGNITY? 
RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS TO PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS LAWS 
 
Marvin Lim & Louise Melling† 
 
Discrimination is not simply dollars and cents, hamburgers and 
movies; it is the humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that 
a person must surely feel when he is told that he is unacceptable 
as a member of the public . . . .1 
—Senate Commerce Committee Report  
on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 
To be sure, gays and lesbians also suffer serious economic 
injustices . . . . But far from being rooted directly in the 
economic structure, these injustices derive instead from the status 
order, as the institutionalization of heterosexist cultural norms 
produces a class of devalued persons who suffer economic 
liabilities as a byproduct. The remedy for the injustice, 
consequently, is recognition, not redistribution.2  
    —Nancy Fraser, The Tanner Lectures 
 
  
                                                          
* Marvin Lim is a Peter and Patricia Gruber Fellow at the American Civil 
Liberties Union. 
† Louise Melling is the Deputy Legal Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union and Director of its Center for Liberty.   
1 S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964). 
2 Nancy Fraser, Professor, New Sch. For Soc. Research, Social Justice in 
the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation, 
Tanner Lectures on Human Values, Delivered at Stanford University 14 (April 
30–May 2, 1996), in THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES, available 
at http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/Fraser98.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION  
 
States are increasingly recognizing the right of LGBT 
individuals to live free from discrimination. Across the country, 
more and more state laws are prohibiting discrimination in public 
accommodations based on sexual orientation or gender identity. 
Confronted with these laws, some businesses have refused to 
comply, invoking the owners’ religious objections. As a result, 
inns,3 cake shops,4 and florists5 are closing their doors to 
customers because of these customers’ sexual orientation.6 
Invariably, these refusals to provide service come at the 
expense of the dignity of LGBT individuals. This harm is clear 
from the words of those refused service because of their sexual 
orientation. For example, “[i]t is hurtful to see that we are less 
welcome than the family dog,” stated a lesbian couple refused a 
room at a Vermont inn.7 Another gay couple emphasized the 
“shock and hurt” they experienced after being turned away by a 
florist in Washington State.8 “I was devastated . . . . I was 
crying,” explained a lesbian in New Jersey as she described the 
aftermath of being sent out of a bridal shop.9 “I can’t tell you 
                                                          
3 E.g., Anne-Marie Dorning, ACLU: Wildflower Inn Sued Over Refusal 
to Host Gay Wedding, ABC NEWS (July 20, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/ 
US/vermont-inn-sued-refusal-host-gay-couples-wedding/story?id=14110076; 
see also Baker and Linsley v. Wildflower Inn, ACLU (Aug. 23, 2012), 
https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/baker-and-linsley-v-wildflower-inn; Cervelli 
v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/in-
court/cases/cervelli-v-aloha-bed-and-breakfast (last visited Feb. 17, 2014). 
4 E.g., Katie McDonough, Oregon Baker Denies Lesbian Couple a 
Wedding Cake, SALON (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.salon.com/2013/02/04/ 
oregon_baker_denies_lesbian_couple_a_wedding_cake. 
5 E.g., Manuel Valdes, Florist Sued for Refusing Service to Gay Couple, 
ASSOC. PRESS (Apr. 18, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/florist-sued-
refusing-service-gay-couple; see also Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, ACLU 
(Oct. 11, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/ingersoll-v-arlenes-flowers. 
6 See also Fraser, supra note 2, at 14 (discussing the “serious economic 
injustices” suffered by gays and lesbians). 
7 Dorning, supra note 3. 
8 Valdes, supra note 5. 
9 Ronnie Polaneczky, Store Dresses Down Bride for Being a Lesbian, 
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how much it hurt to be essentially told, ‘we don’t do business 
with your kind of people,’” said a woman who, along with her 
long-term girlfriend, was denied accommodations at a hotel in 
Hawaii.10 “We don’t want anyone else to experience that and [be] 
made to feel like they have no place in society,” she continued.11 
“It still stings to this day.”12 
As suggested in these statements and in the Senate Commerce 
Committee Report on the Civil Rights Act of 1964 quoted earlier, 
discrimination harms a person’s dignity. Yet this harm has been 
given little voice in the debates over religious exemptions to laws 
prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations. Proponents 
of exemptions have typically framed religious objectors’ 
compliance with LGBT antidiscrimination laws as pitting one 
person’s religious conscience against another person’s mere 
inconvenience and mild sense of offense. 
This Article does not question the harm a person experiences 
when required to comply with a law that conflicts with his or her 
religious beliefs—that harm, whether or not it is legally 
cognizable, is real.  Rather, this Article aims to shed light on 
what has been less articulated and appreciated: the dignitary harm 
that results when businesses turn away LGBT individuals based 
on the owners’ religious beliefs. Part I discusses how some 
proponents of religious exemptions, understating or overlooking 
the deeper harm at stake, frame the debate as one of religious 
conscience versus customer inconvenience. Part II shows how the 
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized the dignitary harm 
inflicted by discrimination and the critical role antidiscrimination 
laws play in preventing that harm. Part III illustrates that, in the 
transnational debate, the courts of other countries have repeatedly 
recognized the dignitary harm of discrimination against LGBT 
people, even in the face of competing religious liberty claims. 
                                                          
PHILLY.COM (Aug. 18, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-08-18/news/ 
29900898_1_bridal-shop-dresses-gay-marriage. 
10 Lambda Legal Files Lawsuit on Behalf of Lesbian Couple Rejected by 
Hawaii Bed & Breakfast, LAMBDA LEGAL (Dec. 19, 2011), 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/news/hi_20111219_lambda-legal-files. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
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Finally, Part IV argues that, as American courts and legislatures 
now consider the scope of protections for LGBT people in 
antidiscrimination laws, they must give weight to the harm to 
dignity as they have in other contexts. Accordingly, they should 
reject calls for religious exemptions to public accommodations 
laws that protect LGBT people. 
 
I. REFUSAL OF SERVICE: A MERE INCONVENIENCE? 
 
Proponents of religious exemptions have argued that refusals 
by businesses to serve LGBT people cause little harm if the 
individual can obtain the services elsewhere. Accordingly, they 
frame the issue of compliance with laws prohibiting sexual 
orientation-based discrimination as pitting customers’ 
inconvenience against a much deeper harm to business owners: a 
burden to their religious beliefs. Among the most prominent and 
representative of these proponents are Professors Doug Laycock 
and Thomas Berg. In the book, Same-Sex Marriage and Religious 
Liberty, Laycock characterizes the harm generated by not 
allowing for religious exemptions as “forcing the merchant to 
violate a deeply held moral obligation.”13 Similarly, Berg 
emphasizes that the harm to religious merchants would cut to the 
core of their being, since religious beliefs “affect virtually all of 
the defining decisions of personhood.”14   
The harm to those turned away from businesses is far less, 
according to Laycock and Berg. They characterize this harm as 
“the insult of being refused service and the inconvenience of 
going elsewhere.”15 It should be unsurprising, then, that they 
would deny religious exemptions “only in cases of concrete, 
tangible hardship,” where the customer will struggle to secure 
similar services elsewhere.16 But in “the large majority of cases,” 
                                                          
13 Douglas Laycock, Afterword to SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND RELIGIOUS 
LIBERTY: EMERGING CONFLICTS 189, 197 (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 
2008). 
14 Thomas C. Berg, What Same-Sex-Marriage and Religious-Liberty 
Claims Have in Common, 5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 206, 215 (2010). 
15 Laycock, supra note 13, at 197. 
16 Berg, supra note 14, at 229; see also Laycock, supra note 13, at 198. 
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Berg argues,17 there will be no such hardship, considering 
particularly that “the large majority of gay couples” live in urban 
areas where presumptively there are more vendors.18 Laycock 
even goes so far as to say that he “would have no objection to a 
requirement that merchants that refuse to serve same-sex couples 
announce that fact on their website or, for businesses with only a 
local service area, on a sign outside their premises.”19 Such 
signals, Laycock argues, would avoid “unfair surprise,” which 
presumably exacerbates any inconvenience that an LGBT person 
experiences.20  
Laycock and Berg do concede imperfections with their 
approach, including the idea of harm beyond the potential 
transaction costs. Laycock argues: 
From the gay rights perspective, discrimination 
gets a certain legitimacy, and in the worst case, the 
stream of commerce might be sprinkled with 
public notices of discriminatory intent. In more 
traditional communities, same-sex couples 
planning a wedding might be forced to pick their 
merchants carefully, like black families driving 
across the South half a century ago. All of this is 
true, and in some parts of the country it would be 
very real . . . .21  
In the end, though, Laycock finds these concerns to be 
insufficiently alarming, arguing that “in most cities, such 
problems would be minimal.”22 Berg reaches the same 
conclusion:  
Denials of service do affect gay couples by causing 
them disturbance, hurt, and offense. While 
acknowledging that harm, one must also 
acknowledge, I think, that the harm to the objector 
from legal sanctions is greater and more concrete. 
                                                          
17 Berg, supra note 14, at 229. 
18 Id. at 233. 
19 Laycock, supra note 13, at 198. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 200. 
22 Id. 
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In most cases, the offended couple can go to the 
next entry in the phone book or the Google result. 
The individual or organization held liable for 
discrimination, by contrast, must either violate the 
tenets of her (its) faith or else exit the social 
service, profession, or livelihood in which she (it) 
has invested time, effort, and money. One simply 
has not given the religious dissenter’s interest 
significant weight if one finds that offense or 
disturbance from messages of disapproval [is] 
sufficient to override it.23 
As Laycock and Berg have jointly stated, denying religious 
exemptions  
threatens serious harm to a religious minority 
while conferring no real benefits to same-sex 
couples. Same-sex couples will rarely if ever 
actually want such personalized services from 
providers who fundamentally disapprove of their 
relationship, and they will nearly always be able to 
readily obtain these services from others who are 
happy to serve them.24  
The approach advocated by Laycock, Berg, and others who 
adhere to similar arguments has faced no shortage of critique. 
Much of this critique, however, focuses on the inaccuracy of 
their economic arguments, most often disputing the contention 
that LGBT people turned away will usually have no trouble 
                                                          
23 Berg, supra note 14, at 229. 
24 Letter from Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. of 
Law, et al. to Tom Cross, Ill. State Rep. (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/illinois-republicans-2013.pdf; see also 
Douglas Laycock et al., Op-Ed., Gay Marriage Bill Should Be Passed After 
More Religious Liberty Protections Are Included, HAW. REP. (Oct. 28, 2013), 
http://www.hawaiireporter.com/gay-marriage-bill-should-be-passed-after-
more-religious-liberty-protections-are-included/123; Douglas Laycock, 
Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2014) (manuscript at 35), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2304427 (arguing that denying religious exemptions confers no 
real benefit to LGBT people, because services by objecting providers are 
“entirely unwanted” and generally can be replaced by other service providers). 
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finding alternate service providers.25 This Article takes a different 
tack: even in the absence of economic transaction costs, 
discrimination against LGBT people motivated by sincere 
religious objection should not be permitted, because of the 
significant harm to dignity that it inflicts. 
 
II. AT THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE LONGSTANDING 
RECOGNITION OF THE DIGNITARY HARM OF DISCRIMINATION 
 
Dignity can be defined in various ways. But one 
conceptualization of dignity clearly recognized within American 
constitutional law—and the conception of dignity that is most 
relevant to the current debate over protecting LGBT people from 
discrimination—is the dignity of public respect and recognition. 
As Professor Neomi Rao states, this conception of dignity 
“requires more than . . . equal benefits in order to recognize 
belonging.”26 Instead, “[i]nherent in this conception of dignity is 
                                                          
25 See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, A Unique Religious Exemption from 
Antidiscrimination Laws in the Case of Gays? Putting the Call for Exemptions 
for Those Who Discriminate Against Married or Marrying Gays in Context, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 173, 199–200 (2012) (arguing that it is hard to 
show, one way or the other, whether LGBT people actually have sufficient 
access to alternate service providers, as this would require difficult judgments 
about whether alternative providers are qualitatively comparable to the original 
provider, whether they are sufficiently close, and other such questions); Ira C. 
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Same-Sex Family Equality and Religious Freedom, 
5 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 274, 290 (2010) (criticizing Laycock and Berg’s 
argument insofar that it fails to address the imbalance between customer and 
merchant and fails to address the extra cost of “locating providers willing to 
serve [same-sex couples]”). One author who discusses the dignitary 
implications for Laycock’s approach is Shannon Gilreath, who argues that 
reducing the harm experienced by LGBT people to inconvenience is made 
possible by looking at the individual harm alone. See Shannon Gilreath, Not a 
Moral Issue: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
205, 219 (2010) (book review) (arguing that a focus on “‘dignitary rights’ . . . 
rhetoricizes the harm inherent in the proposed system as an individual harm” 
of embarrassment, insult, or inconvenience, which “can then easily be 
balanced against the individual rights of religious objectors”).  
26 Neomi Rao, Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 86 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 183, 262 (2011).  See also generally Reva Siegel, 
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the idea that public respect and recognition are necessary to lead 
a full private life. An individual’s private choices gain meaning 
and validation in part through their recognition by the social and 
political community.”27 
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized this particular 
conception of dignity in its antidiscrimination jurisprudence. 
Beginning with Brown v. Board of Education, the Court has 
consistently understood the harm to dignity that discrimination 
causes, and recognized it to be distinct from the more “tangible” 
harm of being unable to access a particular benefit or 
entitlement.28 
Most relevant to the current debate over discrimination 
against LGBT people, the Court has, in the context of race, 
repeatedly recognized the dignitary harm of being turned away 
from public accommodations. The most prominent instance is in 
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, where the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act’s prohibition of 
discrimination in public accommodations, known as Title II.29 
Writing the majority opinion, Justice Clark affirmed that “the 
fundamental object of Title II was to vindicate ‘the deprivation of 
personal dignity.’”30 Here Clark quoted from the Senate 
                                                          
Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under 
Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1736–45 (2008) (discussing various 
concepts of dignity); Reva Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: 
An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L. J. 
1278, 1307 (2011) (discussing dignity as it informs the contemporary Supreme 
Court’s approach to race cases). 
27 Rao, supra note 26, at 262. 
28 See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate 
[black children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of 
their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community 
that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”); 
see also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding that a state’s 
discriminatory selection of jurors violates a defendant’s Equal Protection 
rights, without regard to whether the absence of such discrimination would 
have changed the outcome of the jury’s decision). 
29 Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 
(1964). 
30 Id. at 250 (citing S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964)). 
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Commerce Committee’s report on the bill, which states: 
The primary purpose . . . is to solve this problem, 
the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public 
establishments. Discrimination is not simply 
dollars and cents, hamburgers and movies; it is the 
humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment that a 
person must surely feel when he is told that he is 
unacceptable as a member of the public because of 
his race or color. It is equally the inability to 
explain to a child that, regardless of education, 
civility, courtesy, and morality, he will be denied 
the right to enjoy equal treatment even though he 
be a citizen of the United States and may well be 
called upon to lay down his life to assure this 
Nation continues.31 
The Civil Rights Act’s legislative history makes clear that, 
while Title II is concerned with remedying the “adverse economic 
effect of discrimination,” the “fundamental purpose . . . is 
directed at meeting a problem of human dignity”32 This is shown 
as well in the report’s citation of Roy Wilkins, then-executive 
secretary of the NAACP: “The truth is that the affronts and 
denials that this section, if enacted, would correct are intensely 
human and personal. Very often they harm the physical body, but 
always they strike at the root of the human spirit, at the very core 
of human dignity.”33 
Though perhaps most prominent, Heart of Atlanta is only one 
instance in which the Court has given recognition and weight to 
harm to dignity. Indeed, the Court has recognized this harm 
across many different contexts where discrimination occurs. In 
Roberts v. Jaycees, the Court held that discrimination—in that 
case, turning women away from a private organization—
“deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society 
the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and 
                                                          
31 S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964) (emphasis added). 
32 Id. at 2371 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. at 2369. 
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cultural life.”34 In doing so, the Court found that the state’s 
public accommodations law served a compelling interest, one 
outweighing the First Amendment right to freedom of association 
in this particular case.35 In JEB v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., when 
striking down gender-based preemptory challenges in jury 
selection, the Court stated that such discrimination can be an 
“assertion of . . . inferiority”36 that “denigrates the dignity of the 
excluded” and “reinvokes a history of exclusion.”37 In Curtis v. 
Loether, a case arising out of a Fair Housing Act racial 
discrimination claim, the Court stated that “[a]n action to redress 
racial discrimination may also be likened to an action for 
defamation or intentional infliction of mental distress . . . . 
[U]nder the logic of the common law development of a law of 
insult and indignity, racial discrimination might be treated as a 
dignitary tort.”38 And in the employment context, the Court 
explained in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins that “[w]hile the main 
concern of [Title VII] was with employment opportunity, 
Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic harm which 
comes from being evaluated by a process which treats one as an 
inferior by reason of one’s race or sex.”39 The Court continued, 
                                                          
34 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (rejecting the all-
male club Jaycees’ freedom of association claim because the organization 
lacked sufficient intimacy in size and selectivity, and because the state had a 
compelling interest in eradicating gender discrimination). 
35 Id. at 625–26. 
36 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994) (quoting 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). 
37 Id.; see also Camille Gear Rich, What Dignity Demands: The 
Challenges of Creating Sexual Harassment Protections for Prisons and Other 
Nonworkplace Settings, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 56 (2009) (discussing both the 
“public” dignity concerns touched on by the Court’s “branding” argument, 
and the “private” dignity concerns touched on by the Court’s “subordination” 
argument). 
38 Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195 n.10 (1974) (quoting CHARLES O. 
GREGORY & HARRY KALVEN, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 961 (2d 
ed. 1969)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
39 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989), superseded 
by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a 
(1991), as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 251 
(1994). 
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“whatever the final outcome of a decisional process, the inclusion 
of race or sex as a consideration within it harms both society and 
the individual.”40 
The Supreme Court has also recognized the dignity at stake in 
sexual orientation discrimination. In United States v. Windsor, 
the Court emphasized how a state’s decision to give LGBT people 
the right to marry “conferred upon them a dignity and status of 
immense import.”41 Consequently, the Defense of Marriage Act 
effectuated not just a denial of the economic benefits tied to 
marriage but also a “differentiation [that] demeans the couple, 
whose moral and sexual choices the Constitution protects and 
whose relationship the State has sought to dignify.”42 Hearkening 
to the language of Title II’s legislative history,43 the Court also 
recognized the problem that discrimination presents for children. 
According to the Court, DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of 
children now being raised by same-sex couples. The law in 
question makes it even more difficult for the children to 
understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their community and in their daily 
lives.”44 
In short, American jurisprudence amply recognizes the harm 
to dignity resulting from discrimination.  It takes more seriously 
than do Laycock and Berg the harm of being turned away.  The 
harm goes to a person’s core, to her dignity.  The question then 
remains: how does this harm to dignity factor into the issue of 
today—namely, whether the law should accord exemptions to 
                                                          
40 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 265. It is worth noting that the Court 
has also recognized that such harm occurs beyond race- or gender-based 
discrimination. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323 (1995).  In 
Schleier, the Court recognized that age discrimination may cause economic 
loss and a separate “psychological or ‘personal’ injury”—and that remedying 
one does not necessarily remedy the other. Id. at 330 (explaining that with 
respect to the remedy for loss of wages and the remedy for “personal” injury, 
“neither is linked to the other”). 
41 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013). 
42 Id. at 2694 (citation omitted). 
43 See S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964). 
44 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694. 
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businesses that object, on religious grounds, to complying with 
laws that prohibit discrimination against LGBT people in public 
accommodations? Put differently, how does this harm to dignity 
weigh against the harm to business owners, who today object to 
serving LGBT people on religious grounds? 
 
III.  DIGNITY IN THE TRANSNATIONAL CONTEXT 
 
Courts and legislative bodies throughout the United States are 
grappling with these very questions today. As they do, it is 
critical to remember, as this Symposium Issue shows, that 
debates about the intersection of religious freedom and equal 
treatment are not taking place in just one country. Instead, such 
debates are happening across multiple continents. Only recently 
has this issue begun to percolate in the American courts in the 
context of LGBT rights. However, the courts of other countries 
have already confronted claims for religious exemptions with 
respect to LGBT antidiscrimination laws—and they have 
repeatedly rejected such claims. In the process, they have also 
repeatedly recognized the central thesis of this Article: that 
preventing the dignitary harm of discrimination is a paramount 
interest.  
The European Court of Human Rights,45 and courts in the 
United Kingdom,46 Israel,47 and South Africa have all rejected the 
                                                          
45 See Eweida et al. v. United Kingdom, 57 Eur. Ct. H.R. 213, 239 
(2013) (upholding British court decision denying a British civil servant’s 
religious discrimination claim, arising out of the government’s requiring that 
she register same-sex civil partnerships, in spite of her religious objections to 
doing so); id. at 215 (upholding British court decision denying religious 
discrimination claim by a psychosexual therapist, who was dismissed by his 
employer after he refused to provide sex therapy to LGBT individuals). 
46 See Bull v. Hall & Preddy, [2013] UKSC 73 (S.C.) (upholding a 
discrimination claim against the owners of a bed-and-breakfast who refused to 
serve a gay couple, on the grounds of their religious beliefs). 
47 CS 5901/09 Tal Ya’akovovich and Yael Biran v. Yad Hashmona Guest 
House (2012) (Isr.) (Jerusalem Magistrate Court ruling that the owners of a 
reception hall violated Israeli antidiscrimination law by cancelling a reservation 
to host a wedding reception after discovering that the reception was for a 
lesbian couple). 
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notion that violation of antidiscrimination laws could be 
sanctioned in the name of religion.48 In addition, the French 
Constitutional Court rebuffed a claim that its national marriage 
equality law was constitutionally defective because it did not have 
a religious exemptions provision.49 It is beyond the scope of this 
Article to engage in a comprehensive analysis of all of these 
countries and their jurisprudence. Instead, we briefly highlight 
one country whose courts have already repeatedly faced this 
issue: Canada. 
Perhaps more frequently than the courts of any other country, 
Canadian courts have recognized the dignitary harm of 
discrimination against LGBT people, even in the face of 
competing religious liberty claims. In one such case, a challenge 
to a refusal by the Knights of Columbus to rent out a hall for a 
same-sex marriage reception,50 the British Columbia Human 
Rights Tribunal awarded damages to compensate the plaintiffs 
“for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.”51 
Other Canadian decisions have spoken at greater length on the 
dignitary harm of discrimination against LGBT people. Deciding 
In the Matter of Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the 
Marriage Act,52 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that an 
amendment to Saskatchewan’s Marriage Act, which would have 
allowed individual marriage commissioners to refuse to perform 
same-sex marriages, violated the Canadian Constitution.53  In so 
holding, the court emphasized the harm of being turned away, a 
harm not mitigated simply by finding another commissioner to 
perform the marriage: 
                                                          
48 See Strydom v. Nederduitse, 2009 (4) SA 510 (CC) at para. 6 (S. Afr.) 
(finding by South African court that Christian church violated 
antidiscrimination law when it fired a music teacher for being gay). 
49 See Franck M. et al, Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional 
Court] decision No. 2013-353 QPC, Oct. 18, 2013 (Fr.). 
50 Smith & Chymyshyn v. Knights of Columbus et al., 2005 BCHRT 544 
(Can.). 
51 Id. at para. 151. 
52 Marriage Commissioners Appointed Under the Marriage Act, 2011 
SKCA 3 (Can.). 
53 Id. at paras. 2–3. 
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[T]his submission overlooks, or inappropriately 
discounts, the importance of the impact on gay or 
lesbian couples of being told by a marriage 
commissioner that he or she will not solemnize a 
same-sex union. As can be easily understood, such 
effects can be expected to be very significant and 
genuinely offensive. It is easy to imagine the 
personal hurt involved in a situation where an 
individual is told by a governmental officer “I 
won’t help you because you are black (or Asian or 
[Native Canadian]) but someone else will.” [B]eing 
told “I won’t help you because you are gay/lesbian 
but someone else will” is no different.54 
The court also emphasized that the dignitary harm will hardly 
be isolated—and gives credence in the process to the 
“legitimation of discrimination” that proponents of 
accommodation in the U.S. often deemphasize:55 
[I]mportant . . . is the affront to dignity, and the 
perpetuation of social and political prejudice and 
negative stereo-typing that such refusals would 
cause. Furthermore, even if the risk of actual 
refusal were minimal, knowing that legislation 
would legitimize such discrimination is itself an 
affront to the dignity and worth of homosexual 
individuals. History has established and 
jurisprudence has confirmed the extreme 
vulnerability of this group to discrimination and 
even hatred.56 
                                                          
54 Id. at para. 41. 
55 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. 
56 Marriage Commissioners, 2011 SKCA 3, para. 107. In another case, 
the Ontario Superior Court affirmed the claim of a student who wanted to 
bring a same-sex date to his prom at his Catholic high school. Hall v. Durham 
Catholic Dist. Sch. Bd. [2002] O.J. No. 1803 (Can.). The court emphasized 
“the impact of stigmatization on gay men in terms of denial of self, personal 
rejection discrimination and exposure to violence.” Id. at para. 53. Being 
barred from bringing a same-sex date to a culturally significant event like a 
prom, the court argued, is a “harm that cannot be properly compensated in 
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To the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, it thus hardly matters 
that this regime may inflict no economic transaction costs on 
LGBT individuals; what matters is that their dignity will be 
harmed regardless. The reasoning of these courts follows that of 
U.S. courts when the latter addresses the harm of discrimination 
in the context of both race and gender. However, the question 
remains: will the U.S. debates concerning LGBT discrimination 
follow this lead? 
 
IV. GIVING DIGNITY ITS DUE IN THE CURRENT DEBATES OVER 
LAWS PROHIBITING LGBT DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC 
ACCOMMODATIONS 
 
We are now at a critical moment in the United States in the 
debate over the propriety of religious exemptions to laws ending 
discrimination against people based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.  The question of exemptions arises whenever 
legislatures consider enacting protections against discrimination;57 
where these protections already exist, but businesses claim a right 
of religious exemption;58 and, as in Arizona this year, where 
                                                          
damages.” Id. at para. 51. 
57 Nearly thirty states have no laws prohibiting sexual orientation and/or 
gender identity discrimination in public accommodations. See Non-
Discrimination Laws: State by State Information – Map, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/maps/non-discrimination-laws-state-state-information-
map (last visited Feb. 21, 2014). Another example of legislative contention 
over religious exemptions is the ongoing debate over the Employment Non-
Discrimination Act. See Ian S. Thompson & Dena Sher, Why ENDA’s 
Religious Exemption Must Be Narrowed, ACLU (Apr. 30, 2013, 10:21 AM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/lgbt-rights-religion-belief-womens-rights/why-endas-
religious-exemption-must-be-narrowed. 
58 See, e.g., Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., State of Colo., Office 
of Admin. Cts., CR 2013-0008, at 12–13 (Dec. 6, 2013), available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/initial_decision_case_no._cr_20
13-0008.pdf; Cervelli v. Aloha Bed & Breakfast, No. 11-1-3103-12-ECN 
(Haw. 1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2013); Complaint of Civil Rights Violation, Wathen 
v. Beall Mansion Bed & Breakfast, No. 2011-SP-2486 (Ill. Hum. Rts. 
Comm’n 2011); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58 (N.M. 
2013); Settlement Agreement at 2, Baker v. Wildflower Inn, No. 183-7-11 
(Vt. Sup. Ct. 2012); Complaint at 3, Ingersoll v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 12-3-
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legislatures call for religious freedom protections that would 
make it much easier for objectors to secure exemptions.59  The 
acknowledgement of dignity is thus critical because, at its core, 
the question in these contestations is whether there is a 
governmental interest in prohibiting the discrimination of 
sufficient strength to override any harm to the business owner.   
In other contexts, we have already rejected the notion of 
exemptions to antidiscrimination measures predicated on religious 
beliefs. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits 
discrimination based on race, among other predicates, has no 
exception for those who object to racial integration in public 
accommodations based on religious grounds.60 And the courts 
have also rejected claims for exemptions to integration of the 
races based on religious grounds.61  The question then becomes, 
is there any basis to reason differently here?   
                                                          
00871-5 (Wash. Sup. Ct. 2013); see also Michael Hill, Complaint: NY 
Wedding Site Banned Same-Sex Couple, ASSOC. PRESS (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/complaint-ny-wedding-site-banned-same-sex-
couple; Alyssa Newcomb, Bakery Denies Same-Sex Couple Wedding Cake, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 2, 2013, 7:51 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/business/ 
2013/02/bakery-denies-same-sex-couple-wedding-cake. 
59 See Miranda Leitsinger, Religious Liberty or Anti-Gay Discrimination? 
Debate Heats Up, NBCNEWS (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.nbcnews.com/ 
storyline/arizona-bill-controversy/religious-liberty-or-anti-gay-discrimination-
debate-heats-n40666 (discussing bills in Arizona, Kansas, and other states). 
60 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 
U.S.C.). 
61 See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 256 F. Supp. 941, 944 
(D.S.C. 1966) (dismissing a defense that “religious beliefs [compelled 
restaurant owner] to oppose any integration of the races whatever”), aff’d in 
relevant part and rev’d in part on other grounds 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), 
aff’d and modified on other grounds, 390 U.S. 400 (1968); see also Brief 
Amici Curiae of Julian Bond et al. in Support of the Government, Sebelius v. 
Hobby Lobby Stores; Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius, Nos. 13-
354, 356 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2014) (recounting history of calls for religious 
exemptions in the context of civil rights, including women’s rights); Louise 
Melling, Will We Sanction Discrimination? Can “Heterosexuals Only” Be 
Among the Signs of Today?, 60 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 248, 251–52 (2013) 
(discussing Piggie Park and other cases concerning religious exemptions to 
laws prohibiting discrimination). 
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There is no question that a business owner experiences an 
affront when she is required to comply with the law in spite of 
her sincere religious objection to doing so. The harm described 
by business owners arises from their role as an agent in 
facilitating what, to them, is a moral wrong. The issue for the 
merchant is participation; it is irrelevant to them whether these 
individuals will likely find another service provider.  To those 
seeking services, harm arises from the denial of agency, whether 
or not they could easily obtain the same services elsewhere. This 
is because a person refused help in this manner is essentially 
“told that [he or she] is unacceptable as a member of the public,” 
eliciting “humiliation, frustration, and embarrassment,” as the 
Senate Commerce Committee stated in discussing Title II.62  This 
harm is unlike that of a business turning away a customer merely 
for lack of appropriate attire, as this harm is set against a history 
of discrimination.63 
This brand of harm can only be addressed, as philosopher 
Nancy Fraser has stated, by public “recognition, not 
redistribution.”64 Antidiscrimination laws provide a form of this 
recognition: by declaring a group to have a right to access goods 
and services, for example, the political community takes an 
affirmative step to accord respect and recognition to that group. 
Exemptions to these laws undermine that communal respect and 
recognition. And they legitimize discrimination, even if only in 
small pockets of society, and thus undermine the traditionally 
stigmatized group’s belief that the community will ever give them 
a fair shake.65 
                                                          
62 See S. REP. NO. 88-872, at 2370 (1964). 
63 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) 
(“The avowed purpose and practical effect of the [Defense of Marriage Act] 
are to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who 
enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority of 
the States.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (holding that a state 
constitutional amendment removing all LGBT-specific public 
antidiscrimination protections “seems inexplicable by anything but animus”). 
64 Fraser, supra note 2. 
65 See R.A. Lenhardt, Understanding the Mark: Race, Stigma, and 
Equality in Context, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 803, 840 (2004) (noting that “racial 
stigma deprives individuals of the confidence that they are being dealt with in 
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This harm would only be exacerbated, not mitigated, by 
Laycock’s suggestion that merchants could post notice that they 
will not serve LGBT people or couples, so as to avoid 
“inconveniencing” LGBT clients.  Such a sign would only 
reinforce LGBT people’s feeling of exclusion—regardless of 
whether other proprietors were more welcoming. To be fair, 
Laycock does recognize that public notices of discriminatory 
intent are problematic: he observes that “[i]n more traditional 
communities, same-sex couples planning a wedding might be 
forced to pick their merchants carefully, like black families 
driving across the South half a century ago.”66 But he argues that 
this is the “worst case” scenario, and that “in most cities, such 
problems would be minimal.”67 Even accepting the assertion that 
“Heterosexuals Only” signs would not crop up across many 
segments of the country, the question remains: why should this be 
acceptable anywhere, even where motivated by religious belief? 
It is also no response to say, as Laycock and Berg do, that we 
can sanction or tolerate the exemptions because those turned away 
by religious merchants should not want to be served by them 
anyway.68 This essentially amounts to: “If they don’t want you, 
why would you want them?”  Like the argument emphasizing the 
availability of welcoming proprietors, it is another way of saying, 
what is the harm?  Ironically, this argument sounds in dignity—
that individuals turned away because of who they are deserve 
better. And it is an argument that, at its core, fails to consider 
that grudging respect and recognition, even if not ideal, is still 
better than no recognition—or rejection.69 One need only consider 
                                                          
good faith, leaving them (quite understandably) somewhat mistrustful of even 
those individuals who expressly claim and perhaps even believe that they are 
[nondiscriminatory]”).   
66 Laycock, supra note 13, at 200. 
67 Id. 
68 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
69 This is particularly true when one considers the negative psychological 
effects of discrimination. See, e.g., Vickie M. Mays & Susan D. Cochran, 
Mental Health Correlates of Perceived Discrimination Among Lesbian, Gay, 
and Bisexual Adults in the United States, 91 AMER. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1869, 
1869 (2001) (finding that the social stigma of homosexuality and the higher-
than-average rate of discrimination against LGBT individuals has important 
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the protests at Woolworth’s,70 early efforts at school integration 
in Arkansas,71 protests at all-male clubs,72 or employment 
discrimination lawsuits73 to appreciate the value of inclusion, even 
if forced.Moreover, this argument fails to appreciate that legally 
enforced recognition can in fact be the spark that changes minds 
and institutions in the long run. As then-Solicitor General 
Thurgood Marshall stated in 1966, “There is very little truth to 
the old refrain that one cannot legislate equality. Laws not only 
provide concrete benefits, they can even change the hearts of 
men—some men anyhow—for good or evil.”74 
Finally, it is no response to propose that at least small 
businesses should be allowed to refuse service on religious 
grounds. Laycock and Berg have made this argument on the basis 
that “very small businesses . . . are essentially personal 
extensions of the individual owner.”75 But the dignitary harm is 
no less significant merely because the business that refuses the 
customer happens to be small. Notably, federal law banning 
discrimination in public accommodations has no such broad 
exemption.76 The question thus presents itself once more: where 
                                                          
mental health consequences). 
70 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Chance, and the Civil Rights 
Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 46 (1994). 
71 See id. at 47–48. 
72 See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
73 See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text. 
74 Thurgood Marshall, Solicitor General, Address at the 1966 White 
House Conference on Civil Rights (June 1, 1966). 
75 See Letter from Douglas Laycock, Professor of Law, Univ. of Va. Sch. 
of Law, et al. to Tom Cross, Ill. State Rep. (Mar. 12, 2013), available at 
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/illinois-republicans-2013.pdf (proposing 
that “individuals and very small businesses” be accommodated). Laycock et 
al.’s letter references proposed legislative language authored by Robin Fretwell 
Wilson, which would protect individuals, sole proprietors, and businesses with 
five or fewer employees. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Insubstantial Burdens: 
The Case for Government Employee Exemptions to Same-Sex Marriage Laws, 
5 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 318, 367–68 (2010), available at 
http://scholarlycommons. 
law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1057&context=njlsp. 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b), (e) (2006) (providing Title II exemptions 
only to inns “contain[ing] not more than five rooms for rent or hire and which 
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federal law banning discrimination based on race has no such 
exemption, why should laws prohibiting discrimination based on 
sexual orientation or gender identity have one? 
In short, the question remains: once you acknowledge the 
harm to dignity that LGBT people experience when they are 
turned away, why should our laws and court decisions permit 
exemptions in this context when we have rejected them in other 
contexts?  Why sanction “Heterosexuals Only” signs when we 
reject the notion of a restaurant posting, “Christians Only” or 
“Citizens Only”? Why permit this, even in the limited number of 
instances when the refusal is premised on religious grounds?  We 
see no compelling reason for a difference. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Going forward, American courts and legislatures should 
reaffirm the dignitary harm of discrimination. Accordingly, they 
should greet any calls for exemptions motivated by religious 
beliefs with great skepticism. In doing so, they will align 
themselves with longstanding American tradition and with the 
courts of many other countries. This tradition recognizes that, 
while the right to religious freedom is fundamental, religion 
cannot be used to discriminate, and thus to harm the dignity of 
people who deserve basic respect and recognition in our society. 
Emphasizing precisely this point about respect, we conclude 
with the words of Justice Bosson in his concurrence in the case of 
Elane Photography, a case in which the New Mexico Supreme 
Court rejected a photography studio’s call for an exemption to 
that state’s antidiscrimination law, predicated on religious and 
speech grounds.77 Justice Bosson states: 
In the smaller, more focused world of the 
marketplace, of commerce, of public 
accommodation, the [company owners] have to 
                                                          
[are] actually occupied by the proprietor of such establishment as his 
residence” and to any “private club or other establishment not in fact open to 
the public”). 
77 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013), 
cert. denied, No. 13-585, 2014 WL 1343625 (U.S. Apr. 7, 2014). 
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channel their conduct, not their beliefs, so as to 
leave space for other Americans who believe 
something different. That compromise is part of 
the glue that holds us together as a nation, the 
tolerance that lubricates the varied moving parts of 
us as a people. That sense of respect we owe 
others, whether or not we believe as they do, 
illuminates this country, setting it apart from the 
discord that afflicts much of the rest of the world. 
In short, I would say to the [company owners], 
with the utmost respect: it is the price of 
citizenship.78 
 
                                                          
78 Id. at 79 (Bosson, J., concurring). 
